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Resilience ethics: responsibility and the
globally embedded subject
David Chandler*
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Abstract
This article seeks to analyse the rise of ‘resilience ethics’, in terms of the shift in ethical approaches
away from the hierarchical liberal internationalist constructions of the 1990s and towards broader
and more inclusive understandings of ethical responsibility for global problems. This shift in ethical
attention away from the formal international politics of inter-state relations and towards the
unintended consequences of both institutional structures and the informal market choices of
individuals has diversified understandings of global ethical responsibilities. It is argued that the
recasting of ethical responsibility in the increasingly sociological terms of unintended and indirect
consequences of socio-material embeddedness constructs new ethical differentials and hierarchies
of responsibility. These framings have facilitated new policy practices, recasting interventionist
policy-making in terms of the growing self-awareness and reflexivity of Western actors, reframing
ethical foreign policy as starting with the choices of individual citizens, and, at the same time,
operating to reify the relations of the market.
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It is taken as a truism that today we live in a globalised and complex world, but
what has been less analysed are the implications that this has for liberal modernist
understandings of ethical responsibility. Particularly problematic today are the dis-
tinctions between public ethics and personal ethics (essential to Rawlsian and post-
Rawlsian analytic political philosophy: the distinction between a moral assessment of
the basic structure of society and moral assessment of individual character and
conduct) and between deontological and instrumentalist understandings of ethics.
Modernist framings of ethics depended upon the liberal rationalist construction
of the subject which has been challenged by new institutionalist understandings in
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economics and the social constructivist frameworks of institutionalist sociology
and international relations, which have suggested that rather than having pre-given
rationalist ‘interests’, ideas and understandings are shaped by historical experiences
and the social contexts in which actors are embedded.1 In these increasingly
dominant post-rationalist framings, the individual is no longer seen as an isolated
actor but rather as a socially, environmentally and materially embedded subject. It is
also argued that our social and material embeddedness does not just differentiate,
limit and constrain our rationality but that, even more problematically, the con-
sequences of our decisions take on greater importance as our actions are inserted
into powerful processes of complex global interaction, extending the impact of our
individual actions and choices.2
In a globalised world, the most important impacts of our choices and decisions are
held to be unintentional: or ‘side effects’ in the language of Ulrich Beck.3 In this way,
global complexity and interconnectivity are held to pose substantial problems with
regard to judging where responsibility lies for the world and for the provision of a
satisfactory moral compass for our everyday lives. Global complexity, and the ethical
constructions it gives rise to, discursively tends to elide any clear divide between
subject and the external world and between the public and the private. For this
reason, Weber’s binary ethical ontology that: ‘all ethically orientated action can
be guided by either of two fundamentally different, irredeemably incompatible
maxims . . . an ‘‘ethics of conviction’’ or an ‘‘ethics of responsibility’’’,4 seems to be
much less tenable today. In a world of complexity, ethical responsibility tends to be
reformulated to take account of the fact that the consequences of our actions are
dependent upon the socio-material processes into which they are inserted. The field
of ethical and political responsibility is therefore defined less by our personal or our
public choices and more by our embeddedness in emergent chains of causality.5 In a
global relational ontology, our ethical responsibilities stem from the unintended
consequences of our relational embeddedness and our ethical duty to become
reflexively awareness of this. This very distinct and, I argue, problematic reformula-
tion of ethical responsibility is conceptualised here as ‘resilience ethics’.
This article seeks to stake out a series of claims with regard to the rise of the
relational ethics of resilience, premised upon our ontological embeddedness in
complex chains of global interconnection.6 First, it is concerned with drawing out
how understandings of relational responsibility have become increasingly central to
mainstream policy and academic thinking, highlighting the conceptual links between
the ontological or ‘new materialist’ turn in social theory and the rise of post-
rationalist or post-Rawlsian thinking more broadly. Second, it highlights how the
ethics of global relational embeddedness redistribute ethical responsibility in ways
which rather than challenging power inequalities appear to affirm or reify them.
Resilience ethics rearticulate ‘Western responsibility’ for global outcomes on the
basis of relational embeddedness, rather than superior liberal values or institutions,
and rearticulate the outcomes of market relations in terms of the embedded
relational choices of individuals. In essence, relational ontologies may provide a
new ethical compass of self-reflexivity for a fluid and complex world, but only do so
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at the expense of the ethical separation of the self from the world. Without the
separation of the ethical subject from the world it is impossible to engage in
transformative political projects based on the critique of structural relations of power
and the market. Instead, critique of the world is displaced by reflexive ethico-political
work on the self.
The following section considers the rise of these ‘ontological’, materialist under-
standings of ethical responsibility as a shift away from the liberal ‘top down’
constructions of the 1990s, in which the West assumed traditional political res-
ponsibilities for the outcomes of intervention, while assuming that ‘criminal’ elites
and individuals bore sole responsibility for war crimes and human rights abuses. ‘Top
down’ global ethics worked on the basis of direct responsibilities, assuming direct
political and legal authority over subjects, denied equal rights.7 The following
sections discuss the evolution of ‘resilience ethics’, which works on the basis of
indirect assumptions of responsibility, not the basis of legal, moral or political
responsibility but on the basis of our relational embeddedness: the understanding of
indirect side-effects caused by our associational connectivity in a complex and
globalised world. On the international level, powerful Western states take respon-
sibility for the unintended or indirect outcomes of market forces and their
institutional frameworks. However, it is important to stress that this ‘responsibility’
cannot be properly understood in either political or moral terms. Resilience ethics fit
with neither Weber’s ‘ethics of responsibility’ nor his ‘ethics of conviction’. Instead,
we see the rise of a relational, material or ontological ethic: a sociological recognition
of the side-effects of complex global associational interconnections and their
emergent properties.
This article seeks to problematise this shift by arguing that at the heart of resilience
ethics is the rearticulation of power hierarchies and the reification of market relations
and outcomes. The sociological framing of global complexity tends to understand
the inequalities and conflicts that exist in the world as products of unintended
consequences in a world in which modernist rationalities no longer operate. In other
words, they highlight that the outcomes of liberal frameworks of political and legal
freedoms and market exchange, in a world of difference and clashing temporalities,
can reproduce inequalities and become a barrier to progress. In this perspective,
Marxists are therefore right that the market is irrational and can reproduce
inequality, where they are wrong is in the assumption that we can somehow stand
outside the associational interconnections of a globalised world. The sociologisation
of the market, as a self-emerging complex and adaptive process of indirect chains of
connection and causation, in which we all embedded at different levels with different
consequences, removes the liberal understanding of direct political or ethical
responsibility for our choices.
The ethical and political duties emerging from these indirect responsibilities
operate on a different register to the traditional liberal framing of law, sovereignty,
rights and intervention as, for the sociologically embedded subject, there is no
assumption of pre-existing autonomy. Two examples of this framing of indirect
responsibility are analyzed in the work of Paul Collier and Thomas Pogge, these
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authors are taken as heurist examples to demonstrate the ontological framings, which
enable the construction of indirect understandings of responsibility today. Neither
author is known as a complexity theorist, both are generally read as liberal-minded
policy-reformers. Drawing out the implications of their writings for resilience ethics
thereby involves reading their work at a level of ontological structure, which they
themselves do not explicitly draw out and would probably normatively dispute. In
conclusion, I will suggest that the flatter (but not flat) ontology of indirect
responsibility replaces a liberal framing, of responsibility to the self or to the
community, with responsibilities externally imposed upon actors through their
embeddedness. In our relational embeddedness, we become responsible for the
world but capable only of working to change the world indirectly through working on
our own ethical self-growth. In this sense, resilience ethics work beyond the public/
instrumental and private/deontological divide.
RESILIENCE ETHICS
Under discourses of complexity and social relationality, power relations can easily
evaporate into complex processes of indirect interconnection, where responsibility
for the actions of governments as much as the actions of individuals, is seen to be
shared much more equally. This process of dismantling frameworks of individual
and collective responsibility often appears as an enlightened, socially rich, actor-
networked perspective.8 These richer social ontological approaches*highlighted in
the rise of assemblage theory, new materialism, and post-humanism*tend to work
on the basis of ‘flat’ or ‘bottom-up’ ontologies of interconnection.9 Here, agency is
distributed away from the formal centres of political power (the focus of liberal
ontologies) and towards the margins or the ‘everyday’ where the ‘tactics’ of ordinary
people contest and disrupt the strategies and understandings of the powerful.10
In these more fluid ontologies, governing or personal intentionality is much less
important than the complex ontological reality of social interconnectivity. The more
broadly the connections are drawn, the more diverse are the actors and agents that
need to be drawn in to provide an adequate explanation of concrete policy
outcomes.11 The focus upon the social relational embeddedness that produces
concrete realities, rather than upon the abstract or metaphysical constructions of
human purpose and intention, also enables agency to be redistributed beyond purely
human, or anthropomorphic constructions of intentionality.12
However, it is important to note that resilience ethics do not merely problematise
the understanding of individual responsibility and bring the contingency of
assemblages of interconnection into play, but also articulate a new framing
of international hierarchy, which builds upon these ontological understandings of
associational embeddedness.13 This is because resilience ethics work through
establishing the ontological power of social relational interconnection but then
rearticulate the gap between conscious intention and concrete outcomes in terms of
the ethical demand for self-reflexivity. Resilience ethics work back from the
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appearance of the world to enable an embedded ethical reflexivity to guide the
subject’s own self-transformation.14 In this framing, the problems of the world can
be reinterpreted as ethical lessons for self-growth and self-awareness. The indirect
ethical responsibility derived from self-reflexivity can thereby be neither understood
as instrumental (it is the self-reflexive responses to outcomes which are important
rather than the outcomes per se) nor as deontological (ethics are derived from
external consequences). In this way, in a more interconnected world, Western agency
can be rearticulated in terms of this distinct form of indirect ethical responsibility.
Western powers can claim responsibility for the world, but rather than these
claims of responsibility generating moral opprobrium or demands for political
accountability, they can be used to produce new, reflexive, forms of ethico-political
authority.
To explain how this inversion works, it is worth recalling a point emphasised in the
work of Hannah Arendt on how agency works in relation to ‘guilt’. As Arendt noted,
when we claim that ‘we are all guilty’ we are actually expressing ‘solidarity with the
wrong-doers’ rather than the wronged.15 This is the mirror-opposite of direct
relations of political solidarity with the wronged, which suggests that we support
their challenge to power in righting those wrongs. I wish to draw out, in particular,
how this inversion works in relation to capitalism or market relations. In modernist
framings, political solidarity was often demonstrated in understanding a common
cause of struggle against market relations and its enforcement through the coercive
political power of capital. In today’s understandings of embedded associational
responsibility for the unintended consequences of our actions, we are more likely to
see our lifestyle or consumption choices as responsible for inequalities, conflict or
environmental problems.16 In an age of political complexity, when it is ‘easier to
imagine the end of the world than the end of capitalism’,17 in effect, responsibility is
recast or internalised; displacing capitalism as the problem through vicariously seeing
ourselves as responsible: understanding capitalism as merely a complex emergent
process of exchanges in which we are to differing extents embedded and therefore
indirectly responsible. In an age where the overthrow of capitalism seems unimagin-
able, capitalism is transformed as the sociological vehicle of connection, displacing the
conscious and direct chains of politics.
It is precisely in this inversion; in this shift of political responsibility, from social
structures and political frameworks external to ourselves, to the recognition of our
own indirect social or societal responsibility, as complicit through our own choices
and actions, that resilience ethics operates. Resilience ethics redistributes responsi-
bility and emphasises the indirect, unintended and relational networks of complex
causation because problems are reconceived as not political, economic or moral but
as societal or ontological. They are the problems of ‘side-effects’, of ‘second-order’
consequences, of a lack of knowledge of the emergent causality at play in the complex
interconnections of the global world. The more these interconnections are revealed
though the work of self-reflexivity and self-reflection, the more responsibility
governments, other actors and individuals, acting in the world, have. We learn and
learn again that we are responsible for the world, not because of our conscious
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choices or because our actions lacked the right ethical intention, but because the
world’s complexity is beyond our capacity to know and understand in advance:
the unknowability of the outcomes of our action does not remove our ethical
responsibility for our actions, it, in fact, heightens our responsibility for these second-
order consequences or side-effects. In a complex and interconnected world, few
events or problems evade appropriation within this framing, providing an opportu-
nity for recasting responsibility in these ways.
RESILIENCE ETHICS AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
In the international sphere, the articulation of political and ethical responsibilities has
become transformed since the end of the Cold War. In the early 1980s, US President
Ronald Reagan controversially described the Soviet Union as the ‘Evil Empire’, in an
attempt to reinvigorate the ideological certainties of the geo-political divide, but no
one in the West assumed that Western governments or citizens were in any way
responsible for the acts of the Soviet Union. The concept of Western moral or ethical
responsibility for the actions of other governments only began to arise in the 1990s,
with the articulation of global moral or ethical understandings underpinning the
foreign policies of Western governments and giving content to the doctrines of
humanitarian intervention and human rights enforcement.
Discussions of humanitarian atrocities from Rwanda to Srebrenica, focused on
individuals and elites, held to bear individual moral and political responsibility for war
crimes and human rights abuses,18 but also on the West’s responsibility to intervene to
prevent these atrocities and to protect basic human rights. While the West was not
held to be responsible for the crimes of Stalinism it was now held that there was
complicity through non-intervening, which was seen as allowing the crimes of human
rights abuse in sub-Saharan Africa or the Balkans. It was argued that the globalised
world was increasingly becoming one community with shared norms and values and
that foreign policy was not merely about national interests but liberal universal
concerns of laws and rights.19
In the 1990s, the ethical or political responsibility of the West was generally cast in
the direct terms of intervention to prevent human rights abuses by ‘others’. The
articulation of responsibility in a global world was couched in the universal rationalist
terms of liberal discourse. Crimes of war or of human rights abuse were held to
constitute an ethical and political ‘right’ of intervention (even if this right was not
formally upheld in international law).20 So, while the West or the ‘international
community’ had a ‘responsibility’ to intervene, the understanding of responsibility
for the crimes themselves was placed squarely with the ‘other’ criminal, insane or
maleficent elites and individuals, held to be responsible for mass humanitarian
abuses in the ‘new wars’,21 and therefore liable to military intervention, regime
change and to judgment through new international courts and tribunals. The liberal
discourse of rights and law pitted intervention against sovereignty, with the top down
claim that sovereign rights were lost and replaced by new international sovereign
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responsibilities, clearly manifested in the 1990s’ protectorate powers over Bosnia,
Kosovo and Timor-Leste.
This understanding of responsibility maintained a clear dividing line between
qualitatively different types of responsibility. ‘We’ had the responsibility to intervene,
to prevent human rights abuses and war crimes, but our responsibility only arose
after the fact, in response to these problems; we had no responsibility in terms of
causing these problems. We were not, even indirectly, ‘guilty’ of the crime itself,
merely of passivity in the face of such crimes. The liberal internationalist under-
standing of political and ethical responsibility was sharply bifurcated: responsibility
for war crimes and human rights abuses was restricted to individuals or discrete
groups of ‘others’; responsibility for the outcomes of intervention was restricted to
the international ‘saviours’ bringing peace, development and democracy.22 After the
1990s, this linear liberal framing became increasingly hollowed out with responsi-
bility, both for crimes and interventionist outcomes, becoming distributed more
equally.
In the sphere of international relations, the sociological logic of indirect
responsibility*of resilience ethics*initially emerged in distinction to the rationalist
logic of international liberalism, for example, in work in the tradition of the English
School. In Robert Jackson’s influential study, Quasi-States: Sovereignty, International
Relations and the Third World, published in 1990, the discursive logic of societal inter-
relations is clear. It is the conceptualisation of indirect responsibility that I wish to
heuristically focus upon here. Jackson does not argue for the return of colonial
paternalism, but for what might be seen as a new type of informal or resilience
‘paternalism’23: a recognition that the problems of post-colonial states were not
merely of their own making but a problem of emergent causality*a ‘side-effect’ of
the attempt to instigate an international constitutional order on the basis of equal
sovereignty. This constitutional order stacked the deck against domestic develop-
ment and democratisation and is argued to have encouraged despotism.
Jackson did not argue that the West should take formal ‘moral or legal
responsibility’ for post-colonial states on the basis of their incapacity.24 Instead,
the new problematic emerging was one of recognising the unintended consequences
of institutionalist frameworks, held to be a barrier to development and democracy in
these states. The key point about the emergence of what I am calling resilience ethics
is that in recognising ‘responsibility’ for the problems caused by the ‘side-effects’ of
shared institutional frameworks, there is an understanding of a new type of material
ethical responsibility. This is neither moral nor political*the institutions were
established for the best of reasons (e.g., in the case of the United Nations and the
UN Charter’s enshrining of non-intervention, the prevention of war)*but an
associational, networked, or indirect and unintentional ‘ontological’ responsibility.
With this new type of ‘responsibility’ comes an imperative to ethically reconsider
these institutions in the knowledge that the institutional framework shapes the
possibilities and actions of others (in this case, ‘quasi-states’). Once the associational
link is established, through the connective framework of effects, then the West has the
ethical/political responsibility to reflexively consider a different set of institutional
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practices which may more positively affect the outcomes in post-colonial states.
Resilience ethics argues that, like it or not, powerful states shape international
institutions and therefore bear responsibility for their unintended consequences. The
argument then follows that if international institutional frameworks have a deleterious
effect on ‘quasi-states’, others should be considered which could have a positive effect.
While not assuming political responsibility for post-colonial states, as in the top down
paternalism of colonialism or of 1990s liberal internationalism, the associational
responsibility confers upon the West the right to intervene indirectly, though the
institutional framework, to positively affect the outcomes at the level of the post-
colonial state. This is neither the old paternalism of colonialism nor the equal
sovereignty of the post-colonial period but the recognition that inequality (the fact that
powerful states shape the international institutional framework) gives Western states
responsibility because they shape indirectly the outcomes for other weaker states.
In the framework of resilience ethics, there is therefore no such thing as non-
intervention. Intervention is no longer understood as the formal undermining of
sovereignty, as in colonialism. Intervention is seen to take place indirectly through
the institutional frameworks and agreements of the international arena and therefore
the West is understood to be always indirectly intervening in the domestic politics
of the post-colonial world through the institutional shaping of both economic and
political relations. It is on the basis of this understanding that Western states then
have the ethical/political responsibility to reconsider this international institutional
framework with regard to these outcomes. In passing, it should be noted that there is
a similar resilience ethic at play in the argument that states have a duty to reflexively
influence the private choices of citizens.25 Once there is an assumption that in an
interconnected world there is no sphere of autonomous choice-making there is then
no barrier to the rise of the resilience ethics of intervention through indirect means.
THE RESILIENCE ETHICS OF PAUL COLLIER AND THOMAS POGGE
It is important to highlight that the consequences of a more sociological approach,
which understands responsibility as a product of associational links, actor networks
or assemblages, is that discourses of responsibility are neither political nor moral but
ontological. Responsibility is ontologised, spread much more thinly but also in
context-specific ways so that responsibility is always a shared but fluid concept. This
is very different to modernist understandings of responsibility, which operated to
demarcate a sphere of ethical understanding: political responsibility stopped with the
sovereign or government, moral responsibility stopped with the private conscience.
Ontological responsibility knows no political or private subjects only subjects always
and already embedded in fluid and complex networks of association. It is the
networks of association that allocate the ontological responsibilities to actors.
Responsibility no longer emerges from the decisions of the subject itself*to be
legitimised in instrumental or deontological terms. The ethical responsibility is
secondary: to reflexively adapt to the unintended outcomes of structures and
processes in which actors are embedded.
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The sociological, institutionalist sensitivity articulated by Robert Jackson,
remained at a fairly abstract level, typical of the English School approach, concerned
with drawing a sociological ‘third way’ between the rationalisms of Realism and
Liberalism in international relations theory. The sociological approach is heuristi-
cally drawn out in more depth below in an analysis of the conceptual frameworks
deployed by two influential theorists: Oxford academic and World Bank policy
advisor, Paul Collier, and Thomas Pogge, a moral and political philosopher and
director of the Global Justice Program at Yale University.
Paul Collier’s work is notable in that it removes the liberal rationalist ethics of
responsibility from understandings of state collapse and human rights abuses by
posing the problems of conflict and lack of development as matters of formal and
informal associational connections; in effect, reducing both politics and economics to
sociological understandings of embedded context. Collier argues against the direct
responsibility approach of liberal internationalism: that we cannot rescue them by
telling them what to do or by throwing aid money at them. Change ‘must come
predominately from within; we cannot impose it on them’.26 However, we can help in
terms of our own reflexivity about the international institutional frameworks which
rich Western countries support and have established. Changing them ‘from within’
can be done if change also comes, reflexively, ‘from within’, at the international
level; rethinking the unintended consequences of trade regulations or of not having
international agreements on extractive industries or the arms trade. This indirect
approach of intervention works on the basis of Western states and international
institutions reflexively working to address the unintended consequences of their actions
rather than directly intervening or claiming the right of intervention in other states.
Collier, together with his Oxford colleagues, developed the ‘greed and grievance’
model of conflict in the mid-2000s.27 This model could be seen as a clear step back
from the bifurcated framework of responsibility justifying liberal internationalist
interventions in the 1990s. The indirect framing of responsibility of Collier has a
much richer model of social interaction, developing an understanding of post-
colonial or post-conflict societies as shaped by the choice-making context in which
actors are embedded. In their critique of theorists who sought to understand conflict
in the rational terms of political rights (struggles over grievances), Collier and his
team sought to analyse conflict in terms of the institutional constraints upon
individual choice-making. In this framing, political causation no longer becomes an
explanatory or a legitimating factor, rather, it is the opportunity for rebellion that has
explanatory value. Essentially, if finance is easily available (e.g., due to easy access to
primary commodity exports) and there is little opportunity cost (i.e. few other
avenues to earn income, if access to secondary education is low and the economy is
stagnant) then conflict ‘entrepreneurs’ will arise who do not necessarily have any
stake in furthering the interests or needs of their alleged constituents.28
Political or ethical responsibility for conflict and war crimes is radically
redistributed in the new institutionalist model put forward. For Collier’s project:
‘where rebellion is feasible, it will occur without any special inducements in terms of
motivation’29; ‘motivation is indeterminate, being supplied by whatever agenda
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happens to be adopted by the first social entrepreneur to occupy the viable niche’.30
Once conflict is understood as the product of the societal context, shaping the
choices of individuals, the possibility of reshaping the formal and informal
institutional context, and therefore the outcome of decision-making, arises. This
approach of indirectly influencing the conduct of communities and of individuals, on
the basis of the international influence upon these frameworks, highlights the indirect
consequences of associational connections at the expense of the political responsi-
bility of both local actors and international interveners.
The work of Collier and his team has been highly influential on the policy
developments of the World Bank, keen to take up new positions of reflexive
responsibility, focusing on unintended consequences of institutional structures in a
world of political complexity, rather than political or ideological concerns.31 On an
international level, Collier’s sociological framing works in a very different register to
liberal debates on intervention and sovereignty, where Western responsibility recalls
traditional paternalist understandings, formalising inequality and a denial of rights,
such as the Liberian government’s subordination of financial control to a coterie
of international donors32 or the ‘Responsibility to Protect’ (R2P) doctrine, a ‘full-
frontal assault on the concept of national sovereignty.33 Here, there is no intervention
(as legally and politically conceived) merely ‘interference’: the reflexive under-
standing of associational interconnection. Such institutional reforms of the interna-
tional order do not directly undermine sovereignty but seek to ‘interfere’ in ways that
support progressive ends rather than work against them, for example, in contractual
relations to deter coups where there is a democratic mandate, support for financial
probity or in linking aid with military spending.34 This sociological framing, Collier
argues, takes us beyond the liberal rights framings contra positioning intervention
and sovereignty and enables ‘a compromise between positions that are currently
deadlocked’.35
The importance of Collier’s work is in the clarity of articulating indirect ethical
responsibilities and the practices which flow from these in distinction to the direct
interventions of liberal internationalism, for example, as expressed in the politics of
conditionality of the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, which
sought to bend post-colonial states to their will, in terms of particular policy
outcomes.36 Collier argues along similar lines to Jackson that the international
institutional framework unfairly makes reform or development difficult: despite the
fact that change can only come from within, international states, institutions and
private economic actors can assist in ensuring that in their associations with these
states they facilitate progress rather than shore up corrupt and failing regimes. In
effect, the self-reflexive ethics of resilience politicises all associational connections
between external actors and the states viewed as problematic or failing. It does this
through the ethic of sociological association: that any contact or connection, no
matter how indirect has unintentional affects. These connections, which previously
would not have been understood as political but as private contractual relations of
trade, are then ‘politicised’ in terms of where the wealth goes and how it is
distributed. From the sociological perspective of embedded relationality, there is no
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limit to the ethical injunction to reflect upon how one’s assocational connections
‘interfere’ with others.
Collier’s problematic of responsibility insists that ‘they’ in the failing or post-
colonial states are not entirely to blame for conflicts and underdevelopment but
neither are ‘we’ in the rich West.37 However, he goes on to argue: ‘I am now going to
pin some blame on citizens of the rich world, who must take responsibility for their
own ignorance about trade policy and its consequences’.38 The blame upon the West
is one of a lack of self-reflection upon unintended consequences. Addressing these
unintended consequences means, for example, becoming aware of the impact of
tariff protections, which prevent less developed countries from diversifying their
production39 and of the refusal to strengthen institutional frameworks, which could
diversify state monopolies over wealth and resources or guarantee intervention if a
democratic regime is overthrown. From Collier’s perspective, the struggle of the
poorest bottom billion, ‘is not a contest between an evil rich world and a noble poor
world. It is within the societies of the bottom billion, and to date we have largely been
bystanders’.40 The intimation is that we in the rich West have an indirect
responsibility for the outcomes, that our actions and choices at the moment favour
the side of corrupt elites, conflict and poverty, and that we could make other choices
which would favour the side of progress and development.
Thomas Pogge goes further than Collier in the sociological or ontological
understanding of responsibility through associational connection. For this reason,
his work has been used to challenge Collier’s view that ‘citizens of the rich world are
not to blame for most of the problems of the bottom billion’.41 The irony, of course,
is that Pogge’s work on the international regimes of property and resource rights,
which the international sovereignty regime enforces (and therefore citizens in the
West are complicit with), uses a very similar framework to Collier’s sociological
understanding of indirect causality as the basis for the extension of ethical
responsibility, through market relations. What is interesting about Pogge’s work is
that he is concerned to point out how global institutional frameworks*both formal
and informal*institutionalise global inequalities.
Pogge argues that it is ethically desirable that there should be the spread of
democracy and human rights in the international sphere. Reflexively understanding
the ‘side-effects’ of both personal and institutional choices could thereby achieve a
transformation of international norms, rules and regulations, which at present create
a problematic framework of environmental choices for the less developed world. His
work is possibly the clearest example of how resilience ethics have developed. This is
perhaps most usefully articulated in his 2011 comment article, ‘Are We Violating the
Human Rights of the World’s Poor?’.42 Pogge goes beyond liberal rationalist or
contractual understandings of rights and duties by asserting the importance of the
indirect consequences of our actions and inactions. Key, is not the rationalist
‘interactional’ liberal framing, of government duties to protect rights nor our
own duties to respect these rights, but the relational understanding of how the
indirect consequences of our actions may ‘facilitate’ the promotion or violation of
rights.43 In his 2002 book, World Poverty and Human Rights, Pogge argued that we
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should reject the liberal interactionalist understanding entirely,44 but in the second
edition of 2008 this has been amended to an understanding that there are two
varieties of human rights violation.45 However, the concern is with the distinction
between the two and the importance of highlighting the understanding of indirect
relational responsibility:
There is the interactional variety, where individual or collective human agents do
things that, as they intend, foresee, or should foresee, will avoidably deprive human
beings of secure access to the objects of their human rights. And there is the
institutional variety, where human agents design and impose institutional arrange-
ments that, as they intend, foresee, or should foresee, will avoidably deprive human
beings of secure access to their human rights.46
Once we lose the understanding of the autonomous liberal subject and instead
understand the morality of the world on the basis of formal and informal institutional
structures, which we are all complicit in the everyday reproduction of, then it is clear
that responsibility for human rights infringements has a much broader, flatter or
democratic ontological basis. We are all then to differing extents responsible for what
might appear*not as the commissions or remissions of others (the concern of
Arendt)47*but as indirect market outcomes, outside any individual’s direct
responsibility:
Duties to facilitate constitute then a crucial addition which highlights the vital
importance that the design of institutional arrangements has for the fulfilment of
human rights . . . The purely interactional analysis of human rights deficits must
then be complemented by an institutional analysis which traces such deficits back
not to wrongful conduct of individual and collective human agents, but to injustice
in the design of social institutions: in the rules and procedures, roles and agencies
that structure and organize societies and other social systems.48
Once we understand that indirect responsibility lies in the framing of social
institutions and social systems*societal interrelations, with their unending chains of
complex causal connection*the responsibility for human rights abuses is inevitably
transformed, minimising the importance of the liberal or modernist understanding of
political or ethical responsibility. Consider for example, the undermining of rights to
gender equality or education and welfare of impoverished communities: for Pogge, it
is clear that impoverished communities ‘cannot reasonably be said to be morally
required to undertake political action towards realising their own and each other’s
human rights when such action would be excessively risky and costly for them’.49 Or,
to take another example of Pogge’s, if you were blackmailed for the ransom of your
child by a kidnapper, your moral responsibility would not be merely to ensure that
you maximise the prospects of the safe return of your child by giving in to extravagant
demands: this would clearly encourage further kidnap attempts on your children but
more importantly would also affect the kidnap risk to which other children other than
your own are exposed as it ‘may attract more people to a career in the kidnapping
business’.50 There is a clear indirect impact as individual choices and decisions
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constitute the choice-shaping institutional framework in which others decide whether
or not the kidnapping business constitutes a viable career alternative. What is
particularly important to note is that we are not all equally embedded in these
interactive processes, clearly the more power, wealth and influence we wield, and the
more that this influence is extended by the technological and socio-material context
in which we act, the more indirect responsibility we bear and the more reflexive we
need to become.
We may be pursuing what appear to be entirely rational and morally correct
choices but be producing irrational and potentially immoral outcomes. The more
power we wield within these socio-material contexts the more responsible we are for
these outcomes. The irrationality of the world or of the market system is thereby
a product of our lack of reflectivity upon the unintended consequences of our
embeddedness in these relations of interconnection, but this responsibility is
unequally distributed. Here, responsibility for poverty and welfare problems cannot
reasonably be seen to be that of those people living in these benighted states and
seemingly lacking the capacities to resist, nor, necessarily, with their cash strapped
and dependent governments: it lies elsewhere, with the extent to which we are
embedded in the complex international system which we are all in part responsible
for. If the market, and its institutional framing, is to blame, through indirect links of
causation, so therefore are we. The reason for this is that we make the market, we
reproduce it and in so doing have the capacity to shape it: to expand or contract the
profitability of the kidnapping business, for example.
It is these indirect outcomes which constitute our unequal personal contributions
to ethical or moral problems either by our commission or omission. For Pogge, the
extension of ethical responsibility to indirect and institutional frameworks of social
relations provides an avenue for linking personal citizen and consumption choices in
the West with the morally problematic role of transnational regulatory institutions.
Once the ‘interactive’ link between individuals or collective actors and rights
violations is broken then it is the institutional context which increasingly bears the
responsibility, as the framework of incentivisation, or of environmental choice-
shaping. This approach clearly challenges liberal understandings of both individual
and collective responsibility. In Pogge’s work, the international level is the centre of
attention and it is the institutional frameworks shaping market exchanges, in an era
of globalisation, which are alleged to bear an increasing responsibility for the level of
democracy, development and human rights in the non-Western world. Even where
there is development, such as in India and China, this is highly unequal and Western
enforced global regimes such as the World Trade Organization (WTO) and the 1994
Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) Agreement reinforce
these inequalities.51
Pogge’s work does not merely focus on the impact of global market relations as fra-
med by international agreements on trade and property rights but also on the formal
regimes of international law, in particular the principle of sovereign equality*the
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bulwark of international law*seen to make it more difficult for non-Western states
to achieve democratic and developmental stability, the reason for this is that:
. . . the developed countries are the chief upholders of the might-is-right principle. It
is they who insist that the mere fact that someone holds effective power over us 
regardless of how he came to power, of how he exercises power, and of the extent to
which he is opposed by the people he rules*gives him the right to incur legally
binding international obligations on our behalf.52
The international sovereignty regime of international law is seen to constitute an
international institutional framework which makes democracy and human rights
much more difficult for non-Western states, leaving them at risk of military coups or
violent sectional conflict. Although Pogge shares with Collier the view of the indirect
responsibilities of Western states and international actors through institutional
frameworks of choice-making, he extends the links of association much more deeply,
down to the level of the Western citizen as an individual actor or agent.
Pogge’s work, as a moral philosopher, rather than an economist or an international
relations theorist, is probably the best articulation of what could be called resilience
ethics and marks the clearest distinction from the liberal ethics of cosmopolitan
internationalism of the 1990s. In this framework, global complexity means that
responsibility is shared but that it is always indirect and it is always unequal. It is
the ontology of associative connection, which constitutes the ethical need for
self-reflexivity of Western states and citizens who are encouraged to become more
ethical in their choice-making. Having established the ‘collaboration’ or complicity
of Western citizens in ethically unfair regimes supported by their governments,
he suggests that there is a moral duty to reflect upon the indirect consequences
of our embeddedness in Western societies and in global markets. The solution,
in terms of resilience thinking, is not necessarily that of joining a political party to
change policies or offer solidarity with the resistance of the poor and oppressed but
to consider how we as individuals might ‘compensate for our fair share of the avoid-
able human rights deficit’.53 One such way is through charitable giving: ‘Citizens
can compensate for a share of the harm for which their country is responsible by,
for example, supporting effective international agencies or non-governmental
organisations’.54
The new ethics of indirect responsibility for market consequences can be seen
clearly in the idea of environmental taxation, both state-enforced through interven-
tions in the market and as taken up by both firms and individuals. The idea that we
should pay a carbon tax on air travel is a leading example of this, in terms of
governmental intervention, passing the burden of such problems on ‘unethical’
consumers who are not reflexive enough to consider the impact of package holi-
days on the environment. At a broader level, the personalised ethico-political
understanding that individuals should be responsible for and measure their own
‘carbon footprint’ shifts the emphasis from an understanding of broader inter-
relations between modernity, the market and the environment to a much narrower
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understanding of personal indirect responsibility, linking all aspects of everyday
decision-making to the problems of global warming.55
Unlike the liberal internationalists of the 1990s, Pogge’s concern is not directly
with the agency of leading Western states and institutions, nor with the ostensible
‘victims’ in poor or underdeveloped countries. The concern of resilience ethics is not
even with the responsibilities of the ‘poor or poorly educated citizens’ at home in the
West. As Pogge states:
I can suspend judgement about such cases because what matters is the judgement
each of us reaches about ourselves. I believe that I share responsibility for what my
country is doing in the name of its citizens, and I explain what human rights deficits
I hold myself co-responsible for, and why. You must judge for yourself whether
you find these reasons compelling or whether, on reflection, you find yourself
sufficiently immature, uneducated, or impoverished to be exempt from the ordinary
responsibilities of citizenship.56
In the age of resilience and the politics of complexity, responsible citizenship, for
Pogge, does not involve political or public campaigning as much as individual
reflexivity about the unintended consequences of our social embeddedness: ‘Each of
us should . . . do enough toward protecting poor people to be confident that one is
fully compensating for one’s fair share of the human rights deficit that we together
cause’.57 Pogge makes a similar statement in an internet magazine interview, when
asked how his view of ethical responsibility worked, in terms of a rejection of existing
structures or an attempt to change them from within. The answer was very clarifying:
‘There is a third way. I call it the ‘‘Oskar Schindler solution’’: You remain within the
system and try to compensate for the human rights deficits that are caused by the
system because of your contribution to it. If you simply retreat from the system,
nobody benefits’.58
It is interesting to note the secular trend involved in the extension of the ethical
world through the logic of association. It seems that the more responsibility is spread
the less interest there is in the specific problem itself and the more attention there is
to the ethical self. In the bifurcated liberal ethics of responsibility in the 1990s, the
attention was squarely on the problem of human rights abuse and war crimes,
problems which non-Western ‘others’ were morally and politically responsible for
and therefore lost their rights to political and legal equality in the instantiation of
paternalist regimes of intervention and the abnegation of sovereign rights. In the
work of Collier, political responsibility is eroded through being sociologised: they are
less responsible for the contexts in which choices are made and external interveners
share less responsibility as direct intervention shifts to indirect ‘interference’ which
does not undermine formal legal and political rights. However, the problems of the
world, for example, of the ‘bottom billion’ are still at the forefront of political and
ethical concern. With the radical social relationality of Pogge the outlines of a fully
resilient understanding of global complexity emerge, where, in effect, populations
in the West (particularly the more wealthy and educated) become increasingly
‘responsible’ for the crimes and abuses of the world and there is no real need to




The resilience ethics of both Collier and Pogge emerge clearly in their desire to
‘interfere’ more reflexively through the indirect mechanisms of international
institutions. They both reject the paternalism of direct responsibility as well as the
idea that the West does not have the responsibility to intervene. In both these
frameworks, Western wealth and power*the fact that Western states and institutions
set the international agenda and shape the possibilities for the progress and
development of non-Western states*is used to argue that there is an indirect
responsibility for the outcomes in these states. However, it is important to stress that
the unequal distribution of responsibility in discourses of global and complex
connectivity does not stop with the calls for reflexive ‘interference’ with the domestic
workings of non-Western states. Implicit in the ontological understanding of
associational responsibility is also a licence to ‘interfere’ or to ‘enlighten’ the private
choice-making of Western citizens, often seen to lack the required reflexivity in their
lack of understanding of their own complicity in, and responsibility for, these
problems.
While Pogge’s flatter ontology of spreading ‘responsibility’, to Western citizens*or
at least those enlightened and capable of reflecting on their lifestyle choices and
actions*seems to be much more noble and radical than Collier’s focus on
international institutions and Western states, Pogge is, in fact, more ‘interfering’
and more paternalist. In extending the argument that political responsibility should
be further democratised, he shifts the basis much more to the sociological links of the
market than merely to the formal agreements of inter-state bargaining. Pogge
suggests that the key aspect is not so much the impact of individual actions on
international institutional frameworks*he is surprisingly downbeat about the
possibilities of governments and powerful business interests voluntarily changing
these structures*but in terms of the development of the self-reflexivity of citizens in
the West. He argues that campaigns to change international institutional frameworks
are of benefit because they:
. . . help change the attitudes of citizens in the more affluent countries toward the
plight of the poorer populations. The now prevalent attitude of condescending pity
for peoples somehow unable to get their act together, allowing themselves to be
ruled by autocrats who ruin their economies, may give way to a realization that
the rich democracies have a causal and moral responsibility for the great difficulty
poorer countries have in establishing and maintaining stable democratic regi-
mes. As more persons in the affluent societies recognize their involvement
and responsibility, they may change their behaviour as consumers, reducing
their use of products that incorporate resources purchased from authoritarian
governments.59
What starts as a critique of global inequalities, of powerful states and capitalist
relations ends up*as all sociological understandings of resilience and complexity
must*as a problem of the need for ethical work on the Western self (both at the
level of institutions and individuals). Once there is no separation between capitalism
as a structure of social relations and the individual choice-making of consumers,
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the critique of capitalism operates essentially at the level of self-reflexivity and
lifestyle choices. It is thereby through the ethical reflexivity of citizens as consumers
and as individual choice-makers in their everyday lives that change can happen, not
merely in terms of putting economic pressure on regimes but also making it
politically difficult for Western governments and firms to collude with repressive
regimes. In this way, Pogge argues that democracy in the West is also developed as
citizens become more reflexively aware and self-empowered. Developing democracy
then becomes a matter of developing self-awareness*rather than of deliberation or
formal decision-making*and, essentially, a process of educating and enlightening
the masses in their life-style choices, rather than in holding government to account.
This framing also explains how ‘anti-capitalist’ sentiments sit quite happily with
political quiescence. In fact, today, ‘markets’ can easily be blamed for the problems
of the world and take responsibility for the choices made by governments and
international institutions. This is the beauty of the logic of resilience and
associational responsibility in a global complex world. Capitalism or the market
then become a problem not because of the production relations of exploitation and
profitability but because of the individual consumption choices of individual
consumers who are not ethically aware or politically reflexive enough to make
more enlightened choices. If it is global capitalism that bears the final responsibility
and if the dynamic driving the emergent causality of the complex social outcomes is
individual decision-making, then there is little that governments can directly do.
Capitalism then becomes a complex system of associative relations which we are all
to different extents responsible for because we are all unequally embedded in the
global market system which forms a network of interconnectivity stretching from our
smallest private choices to the largest global political problems. Rather than
understanding capitalism as a social system that can be opposed or struggled
against, resilience ethics suggest that we see ourselves as in part responsible for the
market and its outcomes. In fact, as Pogge argues, even attempts to exclude ourselves
from the embeddedness of the market make no ethical sense as our power to
influence the world through our own ethical reflexivity depends precisely upon this
embeddedness. Power relations are thus inversed and resilience ethics suggest that
enlightened governments may even need to ‘interfere’ in our own private consump-
tion choices to enable us to recognise our responsibilities. The more we inculcate
these ethical reflexivities, called upon by resilience approaches of relational and
associational embeddedness, the less we can separate ourselves as subjects capable of
acting politically or ethically in the world.
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